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Abstract
Because of the popularity of the Internet, e-commerce is used more and more widely around the world. At the same time, the 
business style of procurement has also changed a lot. Under this circumstance, online reverse auction came into being. Based on 
the theoretical knowledge and practical status quo, this paper has studied some key issues, such as the applicable conditions and 
the basic process of multi-attribute reverse auction, especially focused on the mechanism of decision-making in the process of 
performing multi-attribute reverse auction. Again in this paper, AHP method has been employed to determine the weight of each 
attribute; moreover, based on the linear programming theory, a multi-attribute reverse auction model has been established.
Finally, a calculation example has been conducted to demonstrate the utility and availability of the model. 
© 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
At the end of 2010, Geoffrey Boyd, who comes from the reverse auction website Priceline, has won the 2010 
year’s “wealth creator” by the Journal of Chief Executive Officer, which implies that the reverse auction contains
infinite business opportunity. According to a survey launched by e-Bay, a successful reverse auction can reduce the 
cost level of procurement between 6.3% and 43%, averagely 18%. However, the practice of reverse auction is far 
more on top of its theories, which are quite conceptive and scattered. Jap (2002) argued that the motive for a business 
to take reverse auction comes from saving money, enhancing efficiency and application of emerging technology [1]. 
From the perspective of supply chain, Wu and Li (2007) scrutinized why and how the reverse auction can reduce total 
cost [2]. Moreover, Stephan and Andreas (2004) proposed that the exact specification of product, sufficient 
preparation of buyer as well intense competition between suppliers are the key elements to determine the success of 
reverse auction[3]. Additionally, Bichler (2002) defined multi-attribute auction as one kind of auction patterns in 
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which more attributes other than price should be considered [4]. Dekrajanpetch (2000) firstly attempted to employ the 
linear programming method to solve multi-attribute on-line auction problems [5]. Enlightened by the previous 
theoretical tools and based on the demand of current practice of reverse auction, this paper established a quantified 
multi-attribute model to disclose the inherent mechanism of decision making in the process of reverse auction, which 
is intended to facilitate the stakeholders to optimize and expedite their decision making as well take appropriate 
actions. 
2. Basic theory of multi-attribute reverse auction
2.1. The connotation of multi-attribute reverse auction
The so-called reverse auction is opposite to daily said auction, namely, it is an on-line bidding mechanism, in 
which a buyer and many sellers are involved. Besides price, many other attributes in the purchase (including the 
quality, delivery date, supplier prestige, etc) are taken into consideration. Moreover, many factors could affect the 
establishment of multi-attribute reverse auction mechanism, such as : 1) the contents and types of goods or services; 2)
ways of trading, including B2B, B2C, GC or C2C; 3) buyer's preference; 4) approaches of tender; 5) degree of 
matching between buyer and sellers; 6) feedback of both buyer and sellers.
Compared to traditional personnel purchase mode, reverse auctions have great advantages, such as: 1) seeking 
tenders and bid via Internet can increase transparency of the trading, save communications costs and time greatly 
and offer more choices for buyer; 2) reducing goods’ price and enhance its quality effectively and cutting costs of 
transaction costs to a lowest level; 3) facilitating to eliminate regional differences. As to the multi-attribute reverse 
auctions, it can overcome the drawbacks of previous pattern of transaction, in which price is the only factor to be 
concerned about, and lead to an optimal match between demand and supply.
Nevertheless, multi-attribute reverse auctions are not appropriate for all purchase activities, especially for those 
under the circumstances that the internet system is not well developed and credibility system is not cultivated 
sufficiently.
2.2. Specific process of multi-attribute reverse auction
In a reverse auction activity, a buyer should make a thorough preparation in advance to make a reasonable 
decision, and perform controlling and monitoring in the process timely to attain an acceptable result. After the auction
activity is finished, the buyer should summarize related experiences to make a better decision next time. Generally 
speaking, the steps of a typical preparation for the auction mainly include: 1) determining products’ attributes and 
describing them exactly; 2) selecting appropriate professional website referred to e-commerce; 3) releasing demand 
information to the website timely and properly. In a bidding activity, the buyer should monitor the whole process 
timely, once he or she finds a malicious bidding (a cheating bid) or discrepancy, he or she should take remedial 
measures immediately to rule out the bidders or terminate the bid. The holistic process of multi-attribute reverse 
auction is illustrated in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1 Processes of multi-attribute reverse auction
3. Decision-making model of multi-attribute reverse auctions
Considering the buyers’ personal preferences and specific purposes, such as bulk buying, maintaining customer 
relationships, or because of urgency of the task, they may choose more than one (non exclusive) winners from all 
candidate suppliers. Therefore, we attempt to adopt linear programming theory to set up a multi-winners’ decision-
making model. The conceptual framework of the model could be described as: according to their actual needs, buyers 
offer instructions of goods’ attributes, and then could figure out the weight of each attribute respectively; as well they 
also need to establish the utility function at each level for individual attribute (scoring based on the function); finally, 
the candidate suppliers with high scores will be chosen to be winners in the reverse auction.
3.1. Assumptions 
In order to simplify the research work, we assume that: 1) a buyer needs to purchase a kind of product and will 
choose a couple of suppliers, namely, the number of winners is more than one. 2) in practice, the bidders might 
consider the effect of economy of scale and other factors, so the number of tender is inseparable. 3) each attribute 
can be quantified. Actually, there are some indicators are necessary but hardly to be quantified, such as rating of 
supplier’s credit and so on. Usually, fuzzy appraisal or expert scoring method could be employed to deal with this 
problem. Whatever is adopted, enough qualified experts should be selected in advance. 4) the candidate suppliers 
cannot be aware of the buyers’ base price and utility functions referred to relevant attributes. 5) there is no
expenditure on delivery or transportation service for buyers.
3.2. The model 
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The first step is to determine the relative importance of key attributes, namely the weights, by AHP method. 
1) Establishing the main hierarchies. Taking the frequently used factors (price, quality, supplier credit, delivery 
date, payment methods) as main attributes, we can construct a hierarchy chart shown in Fig.2. 
winners
price quality suppliercredit
delivery
date
payment
methods
Standard Level
tenders for the same goods
Comprehensive
Evaluation Level
Tenders Level
Fig.2 Hierarchy chart
2) Constructing the attribute judgment matrixes. A common ratio scale (shown in Table 1) is employed.
Table 1. Ratio scale values
NO. Rating of Importance Weight Assignment
1 elements i and j are equally important 1
2 i is a little important than j 3
3 i is important than j 5
4 i is more important than j 7
5 i is much more important than j 9
2,4,6,8, respectively, in the middle between two adjacent value. The value of opposite meaning is reciprocal of relative value
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4) Judging the compatibility of each weight. As each judgment matrix is given by each expert, there might be 
some discrepancies, thus it is necessary to test the consistency:
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Where , the random consistency index RI ’s are given in Table 2.
Table2. Random consistency index
Matrix’s Order 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
RI 0 0 0.58 0.89 1.12 1.26 1.36 1.41 1.46 1.49
Only if CR<0.1, the consistency of the judgment matrix can be testified; otherwise, appropriate adjustments 
should be made. 
The second step is to build up an optimization model based on linear programming, shown as equation 8 and 
expression group 9.
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In this optimization model, Z stands for the general utility (general score), the candidate supplier(s) with highest 
scores will be chosen to make the deal. 'jW represents weight of attribute j ; jkV represents utility of attribute j
in level k ; ljka is a variable of 0-1(if supplier l can meet the attribute j at level k , then 1=ljka , otherwise it is 
0); minD and maxD means buyer’s lowest and highest limit of demand respectively; lQ represents tender l ’s 
quantity supplied; lρ is a 0-1 variable, if candidate l win the bid, then 1=lρ , otherwise it’s 0 ; maxD and minD
are the upper and lower limit of number of winners; lP represents the price of supplier l ’s tender; L is a retention
value of buyers; jkd is also a 0-1 variable, it represents the winners’ k level of j attribute, when k appears for the 
first time, it is equal to 1,otherwise,it is 0; minS and maxS are the lower and upper bound of number of levels in 
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attribute j; jkX represents the quantitative values of each level, α and β are parameters.
Usually, price greatly influence the success of purchase behavior, thus in order to highlight its outstanding 
position, the price is written alone in the model; expression 9(a) is a constraint to the quantity demanded; 9(b) is 
used to indicate the result of bidding, namely, if supplier l is chosen, it is 1, otherwise, it is 0; 9(c) is a constraint to 
the number of winners, in the process of reverse auction, fewer suppliers means great risk, but a large number of 
suppliers will cause great problems of coordination; 9(d) is a constraint to the retention value L，because it is 
necessary for the buyers to constrain their budget of procurement; 9(e) is a constraint to products’ homogeneity, 
which is to limit the level of some attributes; 9(f) means that each level in each attribute has its linear utility function 
(score value); 9(g) is to guarantee that each supplier only provides one level for each attribute in a tender; 9(h) 
means: if supplier L offers level k in attribute j , then the variable is equal to 1.
3.3. Examples
Company A is a listed company in Wuhan city, China. In order to satisfy the needs of R&D activities, needs to 
purchase a batch of laptop computers. The lowest limit of total amount is 1000 units, while the highest limit is 
1200units. The amount that individual bidder can offer varies from 300 to 600. The specific requirements for the 
laptops are shown in Table 3. Here, the weight of each attribute has been determined in advance, and each attribute 
can be assessed by a linear scoring function.
Table 3.Specific requirements
attributes requirements weights scoring functions function values
color black; blue; red 0.05 black:S11=100 blue:S12=80 red:S13 =60 S11=100;S12=80;S13=60
Hard Disk(G) 80 0.2 S2=100 100
Dominant Frequency(G) 2.0; 2.2; 2.4 0.1 S3=100x-140 60;80;100
supply time (Day) 10～30(integer) 0.15 S4=120-2t Depending on the value 
of t
price(RMB10K) 0.6 ≤P≤1 0.5 S5=220-200p Depending on the value 
of p
After filtration, there are five suppliers come from 35 bidders can preliminarily satisfy the buyers’ demand. The 
details of their biddings are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 .The details of five biddings
NO. S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 quantity
1 black 80G 2.0 18 0.8 500
2 red 80G 2.4 22 0.88 450
3 blue 80G 2.2 20 0.85 300
4 red 80G 2.4 25 0.86 400
5 black 80G 2.2 18 0.9 300
According to the principle of our linear programming model, we could establish a specific multi-attribute reverse 
auction model as shown in formula (10) and (11). The candidate with larger Z value will be taken into consideration 
preferentially.   
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Through calculation, we can obtain the orders of the given 5 bidders according to their respective Z score: 
52431 ZZZZZ >>>> , so the buyer firstly assign 500 units to bidder 1, then 300 units to bidder 3 and 400units 
to bidder 4, while the total amount is just equal to 1200 units, which attains the upper bound of buyer’s quantity 
demanded. Therefore, bidder 1, 3, 4 are winners, while bidder 2 and bidder 5 have to be eliminated. 
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we combine AHP approach with linear programming method to propose a multi-attribute reverse 
auction model, which is intended to be used to raise the efficiency and accuracy of decision making in the action of 
reverse auction.  Compared to previews research, more constraints have been considered and the determination of   
weight of each attribute might be more scientific and reasonable. Actually, assisted with more professional software 
package, this model could be more complete and close to the real situations.
Our model is based on a very strict and ideal assumptions, i.e., a buyer purchase only one product or service, 
there is no transportation cost for buyers, etc. Actually, the actions in a real reverse auction is much more complex 
than the theoretical analysis, namely, a buy is quite probably purchase more than one goods or service on time, and 
the expenditure could not be neglected. Moreover, the weight of each attribute is really very hard to be determined 
everywhere and at anytime without perfect knowledge and enough experts. Nevertheless, it’s the first attempt to 
conduct a quantitative research on multi-attribute reverse auction problem, and the basic methodology of  decision
making could be helpful to solve this problem, and in the future we’ll extend our work to a more realistic and 
sophisticated occasion. Thus, we believe our research is interesting and meaningful.
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